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Abstract 
 
Informal payments for health care are common in most former communist countries. 
This paper explores the demand side of these payments in Albania. Using tobit and 
Heckman selection models we control for individual determinants of informal 
payments in outpatient and inpatient health care. Propensity score matching techniques 
are used to investigate the changes in the characteristics of people paying informally 
over the different years. Our findings suggest that vulnerable groups in society remain 
less protected against such payments and policy measures have not reached the most 
deprived regions of the country. 
 
 
 
 
Key words: informal payment, health policy, Heckman selection model, propensity 
score matching. 
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 I. Introduction  
Informal payments for health care providers are widespread not only in the 
former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, but also in other middle income and developing countries (Killingsworth, 1999; 
McPake et al., 1999; Lewis, 2000; Gaal et al., 2006; Vian et al., 2006). They are 
usually defined as payments made to health care providers for services, which are 
supposed to be provided at no charge to the patient (Lewis, 2000). Informal payments 
in health care can be conceptualized as strategies adopted by both the demand and 
supply side to cope with the lack of resources and poor performance of the health care 
system (Lewis, 2000; Vian et al., 2006). Patients pay informally to jump the queue, 
receive higher quality of health services or more care (Lewis, 2000; Vian et al., 2006; 
Liaropoulos et al., 2008). For providers of medical care, informal payments can turn 
into an instrument to supplement their low salaries or to satisfy the desire for a higher 
income (Liaropoulos and Tragakes, 1998). 
 
 In countries like Albania informal payments to medical staff in the public health 
care sector have accompanied the transition from a central planned economy to a 
market economy. The existence and magnitude of such informal payments is often 
attributed to a mix of causal factors (Gaal and McKee, 2005; Vian et al., 2006; Tomini 
and Maarse, 2011). Often the phenomenon is linked to the legacies of ‘Semashko’ 
systems formerly implemented in post-communist CEE and FSU countries (MCKee 
1991). The freely available services and the growing health care demand in the 
transition period are also considered as driving factors from this perspective (Gaal and 
McKee 2005). Other causes are also believed to be the culture of expressing gratitude 
through gifts (Delcheva et al., 1997; Balabanova and McKee 2002) and the lack of 
resources (Ensor and Savelyeva, 1998; Ensor and Witter, 2001; Chawla et al., 1998).  
 
The presence of wide spread informal payments to medical staff is generally seen 
as an indicator of governance failure in the health sector (Lewis and Petterssen 2009). 
Governance failure in this case (condoning fraudulent behaviour) is closely linked with 
tolerance towards corruptive practices in other parts of society which are indicative for 
a lack of good governance. The general low probability of being detected or penalised 
when engaging in such practices contributes directly to the spread of informal 
payments. In some cases informal payments – although illegal – are condoned by 
governments that are unable to provide sufficient funding for health care providers.  
 
 A disputable topic regarding informal payments in health care is also that of the 
‘ultimate’ remedy against these practices. Previous studies have argued that improving 
the remuneration mechanisms for medical staff, increasing providers’ accountability 
and empowering patients’ voice may be remedies against such phenomena (Lewis and 
Pettersson 2009). Policy measures in the last years in Albania have addressed mainly 
the financing of primary care services and the compensation of general doctors. The 
impact that these measures have on informal payments is questionable. The persistence 
of informal payments (both inpatient and outpatient services) poses major questions 
both for the dynamics of the main causes over time but also on the effectiveness of the 
public measures against them. In this paper we use a propensity score matching (PSM) 
technique that allows for matching individuals over different cross-sectional surveys so 
that we can evaluate the effect that individual characteristics (like health insurance or 
other factors) have on the probability to pay informally. 
 
 The main aim of this paper is to test for the main motives behind informal 
payments in health care and to assess the effectiveness of various measures that have 
been implemented to reduce such informal payments over the last years in Albania. 
Data from the Albanian Living Standard Measurement Survey (ALSMS) for 2002, 
2005 and 2008 are used for this purpose. A tobit and Heckman selection model are 
employed to identify the main individual determinants. We also use propensity score 
matching (PSM) techniques to investigate how individual characteristics of people 
paying informally have changed over the years.  
 
II. Informal payments and recent reforms in the health care sector in Albania 
Albania, as most of the other ex-communist countries, has inherited a health care 
system based on the former Soviet ‘Semashko’ model. This system was designed to 
cover the entire country including every single village, following the communist 
ideology of “free health care services for all”. The health sector during the communist 
period was underfinanced and considered as a non-productive sector (Nuri and 
Tragakes, 2002). The funds allocated to the health sector were low and investments in 
health technology were even lower. The priority of the government in health care was 
mainly related to providing access to primary and secondary care. This led to a widely 
distributed web of primary health care (PHC) posts and centers and to a relatively large 
number of local and regional hospitals (most of which had outdated equipments and 
were overstaffed). 
 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) in Albania (National Health Sector Strategy, 2004) 
has recognized that informal payments in health care are widespread both in inpatient 
and  outpatient  care.  However  the  government  has  not  succeeded  to  contain  these  
informal payments so far.  
 
Table 1.  Responsibilities in the health care sector 
YEAR MINISTRY OF HEALTH 
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR: 
HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE 
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR: 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS 
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR: 
2002 
- Salaries of medical staff1 
- Capital investments 
(hospitals only) 
- Operating costs 
- Human resources planning 
- Salaries of GPs 
- Salaries of PHC medical staff in 
Tirana 
- Durres hospital (pilot project) 
- Drugs reimbursement 
 
- PHC operating costs 
2005 
- Salaries of medical staff2 
- Capital investments for 
hospitals 
- Operating costs 
- Human resources planning 
- Salaries of GPs 
- Salaries of PHC medical staff in 
Tirana 
- Durres hospital (pilot project) 
- Diagnostic reimbursements for 
expensive tests 
- Drugs reimbursement 
 
- PHC capital investments 
(conditional grants) 
2008 
- Salaries of medical staff in 
hospitals 
- Capital investments for 
hospitals 
- Human resources planning 
 
- Contracting of PHC services (420 
PHC units since 2007) 
- Durres hospital (pilot project) 
- Diagnostic reimbursements for 
expensive tests 
- Drugs reimbursement 
 
- PHC capital investments 
(conditional grants) 
2009-
2010 
- Capital investments for 
hospitals 
- Human resources planning 
 
- Contracting of PHC services (salaries 
and operating costs) 
- Contracting of hospital services 
(salaries and operating costs) – 
ongoing 
- Drugs reimbursement 
 
- PHC capital investments 
(conditional grants) 
Source: World Bank 2006, MOH 2004, HII 2010 
                                               
1 This excludes the salaries of general practitioners, primary health staff in Tirana and medical staff in Durres hospital 
which are paid directly by the Health Insurance Institute. 
Table  1  gives  an  overview  of  the  changes  in  responsibilities  for  health  care  
throughout the recent years. As can be seen from the table, the main changes between 
years 2002 and 2005 relate to consolidating the financing of Primary Health Care 
(PHC)  through  the  Health  Insurance  Institute  (HII)  (but  limited  in  the  salaries  of  
general practitioners). The reforms between 2005 and 2008 consist of a further 
increase of the HII role in contracting PHC services. The first changes began in 2007 
but to the best of our knowledge no evaluation of the effects exists. Generally, reforms 
between 2002 and 2008 were focused on primary health care and outpatient service. 
Little was done with regard to inpatient care (the contracting of such services from the 
HII will only be implemented in 2009-2010 and the effects are still to be seen). 
 
Figure 1. Monthly salaries of General Practitioners (in 000 ALL) 
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Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2006) and Health Insurance Institute (2010). Note: All amounts 
are in Albanian Leks are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010) 
 
 
One of the measures linked to informal payment has been the increase of medical 
staff’s salaries. Between 2002 and 2005 such salaries have significantly increased for 
the general practitioners (GPs) who were paid through the HII. Figure 1 shows the 
average salary level of GPs between 2000 and 2008 both in nominal values and in real 
terms (adjusted for Consumer Price Index). This increase has been substantive in real 
terms between 2000 and 2005, but there is a decline of average salaries in real terms 
between 2006 and 2008. 
 
Salaries of medical staff in the inpatient sector have also constantly increased 
during this period (especially after 2005), but the average wage for medical specialists 
in this sector remains below the average wage of the medical staff in PHCs. 
 
III. Data and descriptive statistics 
The data used in this study come from Albania Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (ALSMS) 2002, 2005 and 2008. These are cross sectional surveys 
representative for four main stratified regions; Tirana (the capital), mountainous, 
coastal and central areas. The number of households sampled were 3599 in 2002, 3640 
in 2005, and 3600 in 2008. The questionnaires include information on household 
demography, education, labor, income/consumption, health status, health care episodes 
and out-of-pocket payments in health care. The variables that we have used in our 
analysis all come from identical questions in these three years. Using the fact that 
poverty measures in countries like Albania are based primarily on 
expenditure/consumption rather than income (World Bank, 2006) we present here 
figures based on aggregate consumption. The ALSMS consumption aggregate includes 
the main components of consumption: food consumption (both purchased and 
consumed from own production), non food expenses, utilities, and durables (World 
Bank, 2006).  
 
For the purpose of our analysis we restrict our samples to individuals who have 
visited outpatient care during the last four weeks (visited public ambulatory services), 
or who have been visiting inpatient care in the last 12 months (hospitalized in the 
public hospitals). The selected individuals are then asked separately about the amount 
they have paid informally as payments to the medical staff. 
 
The incidence of informal payments is relatively high throughout the years. 
However, the incidences of informal payments for outpatient and inpatient care differ 
significantly when the two types of services are compared. Informal payments are less 
frequent in outpatient than in inpatient care. One explanation for this can be the fact 
that the average wages for medical specialists in inpatient services is less than the 
wages of the medical staff in PHCs. Another reason may be the severity of treatment. 
Patients may feel more obliged to pay specialists in inpatient care than general 
practitioners as they may feel more time and efforts are involved in the first case.   
 
Informal payments are widespread also across consumption quintiles, with the 
lowest quintiles having a large incidence of such payments. What is more interesting is 
that while there is a general declining trend of such payments in 2005 and 2008, the 
poorest quintiles are the ones for whom this declining trend is least pronounced. In fact 
in outpatient care in 2005 and 2008 the poorest quintile is the one with the highest 
incidence of informal payments (26.8 and 22.1 per cent respectively). This tendency is 
certainly signaling that whatever measures were taken between years these were 
certainly not targeted to the poor (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. The share of patients paying informal payments to medical staff in outpatient 
and inpatient health care by consumption quintiles (ALSMS data 2002-2008) 
CONSUMPTION 
QUINTILES 
YEAR 2002 YEAR 2005 YEAR 2008 
Outpatient care 
1 0.228 (0.041) 0.268 (0.042) 0.221 (0.047) 
2 0.293 (0.042) 0.244 (0.046) 0.158 (0.035) 
3 0.268 (0.032) 0.203 (0.039) 0.200 (0.040) 
4 0.327 (0.042) 0.222 (0.035) 0.215 (0.035) 
5 0.271 (0.028) 0.162** (0.029) 0.150 (0.032) 
Total population 0.281 (0.021) 0.218 (0.021) 0.190 (0.021) 
Nr of observations 2120 1463 1151 
       
Inpatient care 
1 0.479* (0.063) 0.548 (0.060) 0.465 (0.071) 
2 0.569 (0.060) 0.602 (0.056) 0.495 (0.085) 
3 0.654 (0.048) 0.586 (0.061) 0.351 (0.080) 
4 0.644 (0.049) 0.529 (0.057) 0.445 (0.078) 
5 0.598 (0.048) 0.517 (0.055) 0.434 (0.086) 
Total population 0.597 (0.030) 0.559 (0.032) 0.439 (0.041) 
Nr of observations 707 677 377 
Note: Quintiles refer to total per capita consumption quintiles. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars indicate if the 
mean for the subgroup is significantly different from the mean of all other subgroups. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
The amounts paid informally to medical staff for inpatient care (per admission) 
are much higher than those paid in outpatient care (per visit). Over the years we 
observe a decline (in real terms) in the average amount paid in outpatient care, while 
there is an increase for the inpatient care between 2002 and 2005 and a slight decrease 
between 2005 and 2008. Again, as for the incidence of payments, the poorest quintiles 
are the most heavily burdened by the payments (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The mean of the amount paid informally per outpatient visit and per day 
hospitalized by consumption quintiles (ALSMS data 2002-2008) 
CONSUMPTION 
QUINTILES 
YEAR 2002 YEAR 2005 YEAR 2008 
The mean of the amount paid informally per outpatient visit in Albanian Leks (series with 
2002 prices) 
Quintile 1 74.733 (20.639) 82.088 (20.486) 67.548 (16.590) 
Quintile 2 76.037* (11.757) 71.665 (17.044) 38.499 (9.838) 
Quintile 3 86.652 (20.342) 80.278 (21.037) 53.222 (11.613) 
Quintile 4 125.885 (37.708) 71.945 (14.106) 59.052 (11.992) 
Quintile 5 122.419 (23.090) 52.283 (10.410) 35.356* (7.874) 
Total Population 103.163 (12.875) 71.110 (9.866) 50.810 (6.206) 
Nr of observation 2120 1463 1151 
       
The mean of the amount paid informally per inpatient admission in Albanian Leks (series 
with 2002 prices) 
Quintile 1 2698.46*** (612.39) 4292.77 (899.46) 2564.90 (710.81) 
Quintile 2 3348.46** (679.37) 4809.48 (753.51) 4127.07 (1676.40) 
Quintile 3 4739.35 (828.56) 5020.69 (1033.69) 2090.51 (709.64) 
Quintile 4 6097.60 (935.21) 5289.25 (1188.33) 4924.74 (1483.99) 
Quintile 5 6470.97* (1193.82) 7679.65 (1904.73) 3396.17 (1003.77) 
Total Population 4835.32 (450.216) 5284.28 (574.32) 3341.70 (525.99) 
Nr of observation 697 660 354 
Note: Quintiles refer to total per capita consumption quintiles. Standard errors are in brackets. Stars indicate if the 
mean for the subgroup is significantly different from the mean of all other subgroups. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
 
 
IV. Empirical strategy 
The descriptive statics show clearly that certain characteristics of individuals (e.g. 
economic  status)  might  be  closely  associated  with  the  amounts  paid.  There  are  also  
distinct changes between the years and between consumption categories. In order to 
further explore this we look at how patients’ characteristics influence informal 
payments during the years. 
 
Determinants of informal payments 
The Albanian LSMS it is not a panel survey so we have to rely on cross section 
analysis to determine the effect of individual characteristics on the amount paid 
informally to medical staff.  In order to have an estimation of such determinants over 
the years and also compare the changes between the years we pool the data from 
ALSMS 2002, 2005 and 2008. The ALSMS allows this due to the identical questions 
asked over the years. 
 
Our first goal is to get more insights in the individual characteristics that 
determine  the  amount  paid  informally.  Not  all  patients  who  visited  health  care  have  
reported informal payments to medical staff. Therefore we have a share of people 
reporting zero payments. We suspect this may be linked to two possible reasons: 1) the 
left censoring at zero, or 2) a possible selection problem. 
 
As we are dealing here with informal payments in health care it is completely 
reasonable to imagine that some people may be aware that they should get treatment at 
no costs, as they have already contributed to the public health care by paying health 
insurance premiums or through taxes and that the law guarantees access to health care 
as a right. Moreover, they may also feel that they contribute far more than they 
actually benefit from the treatments or visits. Therefore it is feasible to assume that the 
data can be better described by a model that accounts for self-selection. 
 
The  possible  selection  bias  may  be  a  classical  case  where  the  selection  and  the  
outcomes are determined by different probability functions. This is a two part model 
where the first part is a binary outcome, modeled as the probability that the binary 
variable is bigger than 0, and the second part uses a linear regression to model the 
outcome if the outcome is bigger than 0. The Heckman selection model is used to 
check whether there exists any potential biases in the selection of respondents who do 
pay and for whom we observe positive values on informal payments. This model is 
supposed to capture the overall effect that certain observable characteristics may have 
on the selection of respondents who pay informally. This is a very important aspect if 
we  want  to  avoid  any  biases  associated  with  the  estimates  from  the  tobit  model.  
Results from the two models are compared with each other to check for 
inconsistencies. 
 
Impact over the years 
Evaluating the between-years changes in individual informal payments for health 
care requires a panel survey that follows the same individuals over the years and 
measures the incidence and amounts paid informally over time. In the absence of such 
panel data, we use the potential of similar representative surveys for 2002, 2005 and 
2008 and employ propensity score matching (PSM). PSM helps in identifying 
individuals with similar characteristics over different years in the absence of an 
experimental set up, where we would be able to construct counterfactuals. After these 
counterfactuals are identified we can use them to observe the changes over the years 
for those paying informal payments and those not paying. This would capture the real 
change over the years not for the total population but for people having similar 
characteristics and therefore produce more accurate estimates. Thus, PSM creates a 
situation similar to an experiment where everyone has the same probability of 
participating in the consecutive year, and this probability is balanced among the 
participants and not participants and conditional on observed variables.  
 
We assume iy1  to be the participation outcome for individual i when this 
individual is subject to participating in the current and previous survey and iy0 to be the 
outcome in absence of the participation for the same individual (see also Deheija and 
Wahba, 2002; Dabalen et al., 2008). The effect for an individual is: 
 
iti yy 01  W        (5) 
 
and population effect can therefore be defined as: 
 
   0|1| 01    iiiii TyETyEW     (6) 
 
whereT indicates the participation in the survey, and iT  is equal to 1 if individual 
i participates in the survey and 0 if not. As the “treatment” here refers to the 
consecutive year of the survey we do not observe outcomes that would have 
materialized if corresponding individuals had not participated in the survey 
 1|0  TyE i . In our case the “treatment” involves the entire population and therefore 
the participation is independent of the potential outcomes  iii Tyy A01 , . The average 
participation effect for the population participating is: 
 
           0|1|    iiii TyETyEW     (7) 
 
The variables used for matching correspond to observable characteristics of 
individuals that are stable over the years. The random selection of participants in the 
surveys  makes  sure  that  the  qualities  of  the  participants  and  the  non  participants  are  
identical in terms of the distribution of the observed characteristics. Given that all 
surveys were country representative, we can assume that individuals had the same 
probability of participating in the consecutive surveys, and that both participants and 
not participants came from the same economic environment. Both the condition of 
random selection of participants and the similarities in the background (Heckman et 
al., 1997) are fulfilled in our analysis. 
 
V. Results 
Table 4 gives the results of tobit and Heckman selection models for the amounts 
paid informally for both outpatient and inpatient care. The exclusion instruments used 
for non-random assignment of systematic non-payers (patients who will not pay an 
informal payment under the given circumstances) are the dummies corresponding to 
having health insurance, having difficulties to pay for health care, and being a health 
practitioner (as the profession of the patient). These instruments are chosen as they are 
related to the probability of paying informally, but not to the amount paid. The 
overidentifying restriction tests (Sargan, 1958; Basmann, 1960) indicate whether the 
exclusion instruments fulfill the requirement of being exogenous to the amount paid 
informally (while correlated with the probability of paying). The outcomes of the tests 
do  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  (the  lower  part  of  Table  3).  This  suggests  that  our  
exclusion  instruments  can  be  considered  valid.  At  the  same time we also  test  for  the  
validity of the selection correction. The likelihood-ratio test for rho=0 rejects its null 
hypothesis showing that OLS estimates without the selection correction would be 
inconsistent. 
 
As  we  can  see,  the  effects  of  individual  characteristics  on  the  amount  paid  
informally (expressed here as the natural logarithm) vary slightly across the tobit and 
Heckman selection models for both health care services. The results show that the 
mean of the amount paid informally for outpatient and inpatient care has decreased 
over time. Patients pay lower amounts informally in 2008 and 2005 compared to 2002. 
However, the exclusion instruments in the selection model suggest that such decrease 
is mainly due to a lower probability of paying in these later years (some individuals are 
not likely to pay and their share increases over the years). However, the Heckman 
selection model shows that the change in the amount paid over the years in both 
outpatient and inpatient care turns out to be positive and significant (except for 
outpatient care in 2008). In other words, in 2005 and 2008 people may be less likely to 
pay informally than they were in 2002 but those who pay informally, pay higher 
amounts.  
 
Residents of rural areas pay higher amounts of informal payments for outpatient 
care  compared  to  residents  of  urban  areas.  The  selection  correction  shows  that  such  
difference is statistically significant only for the amount paid and negative (not 
statistically significant) for the probability of paying. This shows that patients coming 
from  rural  areas  are  less  likely  to  pay  (for  every  patient  from  rural  area  the  logs  of  
paying informally decrease by 0.3 percent times compared to urban area patients), but 
pay in general higher amounts. Such differences can be a result of a mix of visits in 
health care centers located in rural or urban areas. Due to social connections they are 
less likely to pay informally in their own localities (Vian and Burak, 2006), but pay 
higher amounts in urban areas where such network connections are lacking and higher 
opportunity costs are involved (e.g. higher transportation costs, staying over, etc). The 
situation  is  different  for  inpatient  care  where  being  a  rural  resident  does  not  have  a  
statistical significant effect on the amount paid informally for inpatient care. This is 
evidence that the amounts paid informally in inpatient care do not differ significantly 
between patients living in rural or urban areas.  
 
Table 4. Informal payments for Outpatient and Inpatient health care – Results from 
tobit and Heckman selection models 
OUTPATIENT SERVICES INPATIENT SERVICES 
TOBIT MODEL HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL TOBIT MODEL HECKMAN SELECTION 
MODEL VARIABLES 
Log of the 
amount paid  
Selection 
model 
Log of the 
amount paid  
Log of the 
amount paid  
Selection 
model 
Log of the 
amount paid  
(Year 2002)       
Year 2005 -0.683*** -0.240*** 0.123** -0.080 -0.033 0.192* 
 (0.150) (0.050) (0.058) (0.305) (0.071) (0.111) 
Year 2008 -0.672*** -0.220*** -0.041 -1.044** -0.230** 0.354** 
 (0.175) (0.058) (0.069) (0.405) (0.092) (0.155) 
Rural area 0.039 -0.003 0.147*** 0.224 0.046 -0.049 
 (0.146) (0.049) (0.050) (0.320) (0.073) (0.113) 
(Stratum central)       
Stratum coastal 0.486*** 0.187*** -0.162*** 0.900** 0.169** 0.055 
 (0.153) (0.051) (0.055) (0.359) (0.085) (0.132) 
Stratum mountain -0.870*** -0.293*** 0.063 -1.799*** -0.328*** -0.416*** 
 (0.183) (0.061) (0.071) (0.339) (0.077) (0.129) 
Stratum Tirana -0.983*** -0.316*** 0.111 -1.388** -0.270** 0.144 
 (0.221) (0.073) (0.090) (0.540) (0.122) (0.205) 
Gender (“0” male, “1” female) 0.091 0.031 0.007 0.265 0.060 -0.057 
 (0.126) (0.042) (0.045) (0.279) (0.064) (0.104) 
Age (in years) 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.024 0.004 0.033*** 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.031) (0.007) (0.011) 
Age squared -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Chronic illness 0.008 -0.001 0.063 -0.864** -0.180** -0.020 
 (0.176) (0.059) (0.062) (0.397) (0.091) (0.149) 
(Health rate: bad)       
Health rate: average -0.034 -0.010 -0.035 0.023 -0.071 0.437*** 
 (0.158) (0.053) (0.057) (0.387) (0.088) (0.144) 
Health rate: good -0.237 -0.066 -0.094 0.496 -0.008 0.650*** 
 (0.198) (0.066) (0.072) (0.452) (0.104) (0.166) 
(Primary/No education)       
Secondary education 0.014 -0.007 0.122** 0.547 0.113 0.025 
 (0.171) (0.057) (0.061) (0.363) (0.084) (0.132) 
University education -0.471 -0.164 0.223* 0.777 0.088 0.380 
 (0.322) (0.108) (0.129) (0.711) (0.166) (0.255) 
(Nuclear families)       
Extended families 0.116 0.038 -0.008 -0.094 -0.035 0.182* 
 (0.135) (0.046) (0.048) (0.298) (0.069) (0.109) 
Quintile 1 -0.033 -0.016 0.050 -0.981** -0.192** -0.016 
 (0.214) (0.072) (0.077) (0.426) (0.097) (0.160) 
Quintile 2 -0.008 0.013 -0.104 -0.149 -0.043 -0.084 
 (0.206) (0.069) (0.073) (0.416) (0.095) (0.153) 
(Quintile 3)       
Quintile 4 0.460** 0.154** -0.003 0.163 0.052 -0.064 
 (0.189) (0.064) (0.067) (0.427) (0.099) (0.155) 
Quintile 5 0.307 0.080 0.186*** 0.599 0.103 0.295* 
 (0.197) (0.066) (0.069) (0.441) (0.103) (0.159) 
Has health insurance -0.748*** -0.256*** - -0.952*** -0.216*** - 
 (0.142) (0.047)  (0.310) (0.062)  
(Have no difficulties to pay for 
health care services)       
Have difficulties to pay for 
health care services  0.266* 0.090* - 
0.563* 0.152** - 
 (0.140) (0.046)  (0.313) (0.062) - 
Health practitioners -0.653 -0.215 - -0.368 -0.091 - 
 (0.495) (0.166)  (0.888) (0.170) - 
Constant 2.031*** -0.357*** 5.625*** 2.026** 0.252 5.964*** 
 (0.386) (0.128) (0.173) (0.910) (0.205) (0.322) 
N (Left-censored N) 4734  4734   1711  1711  - 
 (3634) (3634)  (788) (788) - 
Log likelihood -4294.121                  -3603.754  -3418.707                   -2669.832 - 
Pseudo R2 0.0317 -  0.021 - - 
Rho: Correlation of error terms - -0.394***  - -0.798** - 
  (0.120)   (0.537) - 
LR test of independent eqns. 
(H0: rho = 0),[Prob>chi2] 
- 5.80 [0.016] - 14.65 [0.000] 
Wald chi2 [Prob>chi2] Whole 
model 
- 69.72 [0.000] - 101.23 [0.000] 
Overidentification tests:       
Sargan (score) chi2 (H0: Instruments are exogenous 
to log of amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2] 
1.140 [0.566] - 0.218 [0.896] 
Basmann chi2  (H0: Instruments are exogenous to 
to log of amount paid informally) [Prob>chi2] 
1.135 [0.567]  0.215 [0.897] 
Note: Stars indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Reference categories in italics. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Results of the middle column “Selection model” should be interpreted as the increase 
The results of the geographic divisions (stratums) show that there are significant 
regional differences in paying informally to medical staff. The results from the tobit 
and Heckman selection models differ at this point. Residents of coastal areas seem to 
be more likely to pay informally to medical staff for both outpatient and inpatient care 
compared to others areas but they pay lower amounts (after the selection correction). 
On the other hand, residents of mountainous areas and Tirana are less likely to pay 
informally compared to residents of coastal and central areas. This difference may be 
due to the fact that mountainous areas and Tirana are on average poorer than central 
and coastal areas (World Bank, 2006). 
 
Older people are faced with higher informal payments for outpatient and 
inpatient care. This is related to the higher predisposition of requiring health care 
(older people have a higher demand for health care). The negative slope of the age 
squared variable indicates an inverted-U shape of the amount paid informally to age. 
This shows that working-age adults are the ones who pay larger amounts informally 
and this can be linked to their higher income generating capabilities and higher 
opportunity costs. As expected, patients in the higher consumption quintiles generally 
spend more on informal payments for both health care services. However, coefficients 
are not always statistically significant showing that differences between quintiles are 
not clearly marked. For instance for outpatient service the selection correction shows 
that patients in quintile 1 may have a lower probability of paying but pay (for every 
patient from rural area the logs of paying informally decrease by 0.3 percent  times 
compared to urban area patients) larger amounts than higher quintiles (though results 
are not statistically significant), or that quintile 4 may pay lower amounts than 
respondents from lower quintiles (the coefficient for the logarithm of amount paid is 
negative but again not statistically significant). This shows that informal payments do 
not follow the trend of the income distribution and that the lowest quintiles are the 
most disadvantaged ones. 
 
Health insurance is among the identifying instruments in the selection equation. 
As we have shown the major contribution of health insurance is that it lowers the 
probability of paying informally for outpatient and inpatient care (this also explains its 
significance in the tobit model) but does less so for the amount paid. The use of the 
other correction instruments shows that people who have difficulties to pay for health 
care are more likely to pay informally. This demonstrates the unfairness of informal 
payments and also indicates that vulnerable groups (e.g. those who are also less likely 
to be protected by health insurance) are more prone to such payments. On the other 
hand, the results show that groups with more social connections and information, like 
health practitioners, have a lower probability to pay informally for health care (though 
results are not statistically significant showing that informal payments nevertheless 
occur among all groups). 
 
Table 5. Propensity Score Matching results for Outpatient and Inpatient health care – 
Time impact on the average amount paid informally to medical staff 
 
OUTPATIENT HEALTH 
CARE SERVICE 
INPATIENT HEALTH CARE 
SERVICE 
Year 2002 – 2005     
Nearest – neighbour matching 0.021 (0.059) 0.113 (0.113) 
Kernel matching 0.020 (0.053) 0.062 (0.106) 
Year 2005 – 2008     
Nearest – neighbour matching -0.152** (0.067) -0.026 (0.152) 
Kernel matching -0.180*** (0.063) -0.044 (0.138) 
Year 2002 – 2008     
Nearest – neighbour matching -0.111* (0.065) 0.096 (0.145) 
Kernel matching -0.125** (0.058) 0.094 (0.136) 
 
The matching results reported in Table 5 show that there were no big differences 
in the average amount paid informally for outpatient and inpatient care between the 
years 2002 and 2005, but there is a decrease in the average amount of such payments 
between the years 2005 and 2008 (statistically significant for outpatient care). The 
effect of different measures (i.e. financing health services and wages directly from the 
HII and increasing the wages of GPs) could only be seen in later years. The overall 
effect between the years 2002 and 2008 differs for outpatient and inpatient service. 
So, for outpatient care there is even a slightly decrease (a 11 and 12.5 per cent 
decrease of the average amounts in real terms). This can be considered as a relatively 
small achievement in this regard. In inpatient care the overall effect between years 
2002 and 2008 is positive (but statistically not significant). Again, it looks like there 
have been more incentives to reduce informal payments between years 2005 and 2008 
than there were between years 2002 and 2005. 
 
Table 6 shows the time impact on the main characteristics of patients paying 
informally when individuals are matched following similar characteristics. For the 
geographical areas we notice that the share of patients paying informally does not 
change in a similar direction over the years. Rural area residents become more likely 
to pay informally in inpatient care services if year 2008 is compared to year 2002 and 
this confirms that the burden is shifting towards those with higher opportunity costs 
(due to longer distances) or fewer social connections and information (since hospitals 
are mostly located in Tirana and urban areas). 
 
For outpatient service results show that residents of the central  area and Tirana 
become more likely to pay informally for outpatient care if years 2005 and 2008 are 
compared to 2002. Patients living in the mountainous area are more likely to pay 
informally in 2008 compared to 2002. Only patients living in the coastal area, which 
is among the wealthier areas (World Bank, 2006), have become less likely to pay 
informal payments over the observed years. The tobit and Heckman selection models 
show that patients living in coastal area have the highest probability to pay compared 
to all other areas and therefore the decline over the years can be attributed to the 
effectiveness  of  policy  measures  in  this  particular  area.  However,  such  policy  
measures fail to affect deprived regions (i.e. the mountainous areas, whose residents 
are less likely to pay in 2002 and 2005 but more likely to pay informally between 
2002 and 2008). Similar to outpatient services there are differences between residents 
of geographical regions of the country. Patients living in central Albania become more 
likely to pay informally in inpatient care if year 2008 is compared to 2002 while 
patients coming from other regions become less likely to pay informally (though 
differences are not always significant). These between-areas differences could be a 
consequence of more resources being allocated to certain geographical areas (e.g. 
higher salaries for medical staff willing to work in remote hospitals, etc).  
 
Table 6. Time impact for patients paying informally (Propensity Score Matching 
results for Outpatient and Inpatient care services) 
THE DIFFERNCE BETWEEN YEAR FOR 
OUTPATIENT SERVICE 
THE DIFFERNCE BETWEEN YEAR FOR 
INPATIENT SERVICE VARIABLES 
years  
2002-2005 
years  
2005-2008 
years  
2002-2008 
years  
2002-2005 
years  
2005-2008 
years  
2002-2008 
Rural area -0.139***   -0.039 -0.061 0.060    0.066 0.109** 
 (0.040) (0.050) (0.047) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) 
Stratum central 0.174***     0.036 0.170*** 0.047 0.109** 0.177*** 
 (0.037) (0.049) (0.044) (0.035) (0.050) (0.049) 
Stratum coastal -0.090**    -0.144*** -0.274*** -0.064* -0.053 -0.150*** 
 (0.041) (0.048) (0.045) (0.037) (0.045) (0.046) 
Stratum mountain -0.150***    0.087*** 0.011 -0.030 -0.006 -0.014 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.035) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046) 
Stratum Tirana 0.066*** 0.021 0.093*** 0.047** -0.049* -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.035) (0.030) (0.020) (0.031) (0.028) 
Gender (“0” male, “1” female) 0.028 -0.203*** -0.128*** 0.007 -0.228*** -0.220*** 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.047) (0.039) (0.051) (0.050) 
Age (in years) -0.023 1.644 0.071 1.101 4.686** 5.367** 
 (1.999) (2.493) (2.282) (1.746) (2.278) (2.159) 
Age squared 144.518   181.639 183.316 185.505 377.037* 522.859*** 
 (158.96) (204.37) (186.134) (140.670) (202.331) (194.429) 
Chronic illness -0.020    0.014 -0.007 -0.084** 0.057 -0.026 
 (0.040) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.052) (0.052) 
Health rate: bad 0.025 -0.005 0.047 0.084** -0.058 0.081* 
 (0.037) (0.047) (0.044) (0.035) (0.048) (0.046) 
Health rate: average -0.036 -0.008 -0.107** -0.092*** 0.005 -0.080* 
 (0.038) (0.048) (0.046) (0.033) (0.040) (0.043) 
Health rate: good 0.020 -0.001 0.062 0.043 0.009 0.017 
 (0.038) (0.047) (0.044) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) 
Without  education -0.017 -0.004 -0.018 -0.011 0.012 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
Primary education 0.059 -0.010 0.080* 0.062 -0.038 0.049 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.048) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) 
Secondary education -0.072**    0.056 -0.035 -0.060* 0.077* -0.009 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.041) (0.032) (0.044) (0.045) 
University education -0.039***    -0.001 -0.065*** -0.032* -0.007 -0.038* 
 (0.013)    (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) 
Nuclear families -0.049 -0.431*** -0.494*** -0.129*** -0.439*** -0.535*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040) 
Extended families 0.034   0.440*** .486*** 0.117*** 0.413*** 0.501*** 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.044) (0.042) 
Quintile 1 0.080*** 0.037 0.052 0.076*** 0.054 0.043 
 (0.029) (0.041) (0.035) (0.029) (0.043) (0.041) 
Quintile 2 0.031 -0.065* -0.029 0.034 -0.036 0.001 
 (0.031) (0.038) (0.035) (0.032) (0.043) (0.041) 
Quintile 3 -0.042 0.019 -0.005 0.033 -0.051 -0.077* 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.039) (0.033) (0.040) (0.039) 
Quintile 4 -0.010 -0.007 0.026 -0.053* -0.040 -0.016 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.042) (0.032) (0.041) (0.042) 
Quintile 5 -0.059* 0.016 -0.044 -0.090*** 0.073* 0.048 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.040) (0.042) 
Has health insurance 0.043 0.145*** 0.133*** -0.022 0.176*** 0.169*** 
 (0.041) (0.049) (0.046) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051) 
Have difficulties to pay for health care services  -0.025 -0.095* -0.156*** -0.023 -0.093* -0.105** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.046) (0.036) (0.049) (0.048) 
Health practitioners -0.022** 0.011 -0.008 -0.027** 0.001 -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) 
Note: Results are displayed for the matching using 5-nearest neighbour estimator. The caliper width is 0.01. Stars 
indicate: *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1; Standard errors are in brackets. 
People with any university education are less likely to pay informally for 
outpatient and inpatient care if years 2005 and 2008 are compared to 2002. This effect 
shows that higher educated people have become more aware of their rights or are in a 
better bargaining position with medical staff. The time effect turns positively only for 
people with primary education if year 2008 is compared to 2002 showing that they 
become more likely to pay informally for all health care services. Having very basic 
education reduces the chances to be formally employed (and therefore to benefit from 
health insurance) and may also limit social connections with medical staff (the same 
table shows that being a health practitioner lowers the probability of paying over the 
years because of these connections). 
 
The share of people in the highest quintile who pay informally decreased 
between years 2002 and 2005. The same trend is more or less maintained for the three 
top quintiles throughout the years (even though not statistically significant). The 
opposite has happened for the first and second quintiles. The first quintile becomes 
consistently more likely to pay informally throughout all years confirming our 
previous findings and showing a regressive effect of measures taken to reduce 
informal payments in the Albanian outpatient care.  
 
In the tobit and the Heckman selection models we have found that having health 
insurance reduces the probability of paying informally. Despite this, the effect of 
health insurance over the years has not moved in the same direction. Patients having 
health insurance become more likely to pay if year 2008 is compared to 2002 and 
2005. The positive (and statistically significant) coefficients show that the effect of 
health insurance in lowering the probability of paying has decreased over the years. In 
fact, it looks like that the lack of further policy measures between years 2005 and 
2008 has created reverse incentives for participation in the social health insurance 
scheme. 
 
VI. Discussion 
By using the results for inpatient and outpatient care, we are able to say 
something about the causes of informal payments in Albania. The high incidences of 
informal payments among certain groups of payers (e.g. rural residents, lower 
educated patients, and those with difficulties to pay for health care) shows how wide 
spread this phenomena is. The significant effects of having less information on the 
amount required (as with patients with basic or no education) or having fewer social 
connections (as with rural residents seeking health care in urban areas) clearly 
indicate a governance failure in the system and demonstrate that not all causal factors 
are exclusively linked to scarcity of resources. Moreover, certain groups in the 
population seem to be more disadvantaged than others. Patients belonging to the 
lower consumption quintiles pay similar amounts compared to the middle quintile, 
while rural residents pay higher amounts for outpatient care. This shows that they are 
very vulnerable to informal payments. The government fails to protect these groups in 
the  population  that  are  left  to  cope  with  market  mechanisms  (You  need  care?  You  
have to pay for it!). It is clear that lack of government support and a lower bargaining 
power of these groups will make them more susceptible to poverty in the long-run. 
 
Having national health insurance lowers the probability of paying informally 
both for outpatient and inpatient care. This may be due to the greater bargaining 
power of these patients in interacting with medical staff. They are better informed on 
what their rights are. However, such relation was proven to be fragile in the long-term 
as we showed that the role of health insurance has become weaker between 2005 and 
2008. This frail status of health insurance in Albania calls for more attention to 
evaluating the effect of ongoing reforms especially in the inpatient care.  
 
Other aspects we have tested were the effects of particular policy changes that 
have taken place mostly between 2002 and 2005 (such as the contractual agreement 
between HII and outpatient care and the increase of GPs salaries). Assuming that most 
of the changes took place in outpatient care (in terms of reorganization and financing 
primary health care centers), we expect most of the effects to be associated to this 
service. In fact, the matching techniques show that the amount paid by individuals did 
not change much during the first years after 2002. Moreover, the direction of the 
changes was not always as expected. Some of the unexpected results included: the 
increase in the average amount paid between 2002 and 2005 for outpatient care; the 
gradual increase of the probability of paying among patients having health insurance 
between 2002 and 2005/2008; and the relatively high amounts (and probability) paid 
for patients in lower quintiles, i.e. among patients who have the most difficulties to 
pay. This is evidence for some debatable effects of the reform measures and clearly 
indicates that weak governance remains one of the biggest challenges in the sector. 
 
Previous research has highlighted government failure as one of the main causes 
for informal payments in health care (Lewis, 2006). When the government fails to 
enforce accountability or fails to prevent non-ethical behavior of medical staff, the 
most vulnerable will bear the consequences. Our findings show that in the Albanian 
context one of the main reforms directly linked with the underpaid health care staff 
(the increase of GPs wages), has proven ineffective in reducing informal payments in 
the  long  run.  This  was  due  to  lack  of  a  follow up  on  reforms and  the  indexation  of  
wages over the years. The evidence shows that even though economic factors may 
play a role in determining the amount of informal payments to medical staff, 
governance issues are more closely linked to the incidence of such payments. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Informal payments to medical staff are widespread in Albania both for outpatient 
and inpatient care. Most of the evidence coming from ALSMS data for 2002, 2005 
and 2008 support a scarcity of resources and governance failure in health care as the 
main reasons behind them. The past reforms and reorganization of the primary health 
sector have only managed to achieve small reductions in the amounts and incidence of 
informal  payments.  The  empirical  evidence  shows  that  even  though  the  wages  of  
primary care medical staff have doubled (in real value) over the years, informal 
payments remain widely spread. Vulnerable groups in society remain less protected 
against such payments and policy measures have not reached the most deprived 
regions of the country. 
 
Patients and physicians are using informal payments as coping strategies to ease 
problems brought about by a lack of resources and poor governance. Judging from the 
evidence provided by the ALSMS data for 2002, 2005 and 2008, the most effective 
policy measure in Albania from a supply-side perspective would be to include 
inpatient care in the benefits package of the health insurance scheme. The direct 
contracting of inpatient services by the health insurance fund would increase 
efficiency and accountability of inpatient care provision. Such measures have only 
started to be implemented in 2009. The effects on inpatient care are yet to be seen 
while the experience with outpatient care calls for more attention on the outcome of 
this reform. The data analysis in this paper has demonstrated that the people suffering 
the effects of informal payments are the poorest or regionally most disadvantaged (i.e. 
residents of rural areas). Providing better protection for the most vulnerable groups of 
the population and adjusting the regional distribution of resources will certainly help 
in this direction. Moreover, every extension of health insurance to inpatient care must 
be combined with policy measures to protect the chronically ill and the uninsured. It 
goes without saying that the increased efficiency in financing the health care system 
would also require taking measures to eliminate informal payments. Experiences from 
other countries (see also Lewis and Pettersson, 2009) have shown that providing more 
incentives for physicians (e.g. revenue sharing) and increasing control and 
accountability would contribute in this regard. 
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